SAN DIEGO VS NOMBRE CASE DIGEST
MOISES SAN DIEGO, SR., petitioner,
vs.
ADELO NOMBRE and PEDRO ESCANLAR, respondents.
SPECIAL PROCEEDING; RULE 84
FACTS:
- Nombre, in his capacity was judicial administrator of the intestate estate subject of the Sp. Proc.
- Nombre leased one of the properties of the estate (a fishpond) to Escanlar, the other respondent. The terms of the lease was for 3 years, the transaction having been done, admittedly, without previous authority or approval of the Court where the proceedings was pending.
- Nombre was removed as administrator and Campillanos was appointed in his stead. Respondent Escanlar was cited for contempt, allegedly for his refusal to surrender the fishpond to the newly appointed administrator.
- Campillanos filed a motion asking for authority to execute a lease contract of the same fishpond, in favor of petitioner herein, San Diego, Sr., for 5 years.
- Nombre, presented a written opposition pointing out that the fishpond had been leased by him to Escanlar for 3 years.
- The Court declared that the contract in favor of Escanlar was null and void, for want of judicial authority.
- Nombre moved to reconsider, the motion for reconsideration was denied and the trial judge stating that the contract in favor of Escanlar was executed in bad faith and was fraudulent because of the imminence of Nombre's removal as administrator.
- A petition for Certiorari asking for the annulment of the Orders was presented by Nombre and Escanlar with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued the injunctive writ and required respondents therein to Answer.
- Petitioner San Diego, Sr., intervened and moved for a reconsideration of the above judgment. The Court of Appeals denied the motions for reconsideration.
- Petitioner contends, that No. 8, Art. 1878 is the limitation to the right of a judicial administrator to lease real property without prior court authority and approval, if it exceeds one year. The lease contract in favor of Escanlar being for 3 years and without such court approval and authority is, therefore, null and void. Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that there is no limitation of such right; and that Article 1878 does not apply in the instant case.
Whether a judicial administrator can validly lease property of the estate without prior judicial authority and approval and whether the provisions of the New Civil Code on Agency should apply to judicial administrators.
- YES. An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration, and shall administer the estate of the deceased not disposed of by his will. (Sec. 3, Rule 85, old Rules).
- As ruled by the Court of Appeals, no such limitation on the power of a judicial administrator to grant a lease of property placed under his custody is provided for in the present law. Under Article 1647 of the present Civil Code, it is only when the lease is to be recorded in the Registry of Property that it cannot be instituted without special authority. Thus, regardless of the period of lease, there is no need of special authority unless the contract is to be recorded in the Registry of Property. As to whether the contract in favor of Escanlar is to be so recorded is not material to our inquiry.
Rule 85, Section 3, of the Rules of Court authorizes a judicial administrator, among other things, to administer the estate of the deceased not disposed of by will. Commenting on this Section in the light of several Supreme Court decisions Moran says: "Under this provision, the executor or administrator has the power of administering the estate of the deceased for purposes of liquidation and distribution. He may, therefore, exercise all acts of administration without special authority of the Court. For instance, he may lease the property without securing previously any permission from the court. And where the lease has formally been entered into, the court cannot, in the same proceeding, annul the same, to the prejudice of the lessee, over whose person it had no jurisdiction. The proper remedy would be a separate action by the administrator or the heirs to annul the lease. ... .
- While it may be admitted that the duties of a judicial administrator and an agent (petitioner alleges that both act in representative capacity), are in some respects, identical, the provisions on agency (Art. 1878, C.C.), should not apply to a judicial administrator. A judicial administrator is appointed by the Court. He is not only the representative of said Court, but also the heirs and creditors of the estate. A judicial administrator before entering into his duties, is required to file a bond. These circumstances are not true in case of agency. The agent is only answerable to his principal. The protection which the law gives the principal, in limiting the powers and rights of an agent, stems from the fact that control by the principal can only be thru agreements, whereas the acts of a judicial administrator are subject to specific provisions of law and orders of the appointing court.
- WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against petitioner Moises San Diego, Sr.